



# JORDAN

## OUR TASKS IN THE NATIONAL AND CLASS STRUGGLE

In the following interview, Abu Ali Mustafa, member of the PFLP's Politbureau, analyzes the Jordanian regime's special role in the coming phase of the imperialist 'peace' and the roots of the growth of the mass movement. On this basis, he outlines the tasks of the Revolution in Jordan.

**The PFLP has a different political position than that of the PLO concerning dialogue with the Jordanian regime. What is the basis of the Front's position in rejecting this dialogue?**

We in the PFLP are perfectly conscious of the overall political developments on the international, Arab and regional levels – that the political situation is in constant motion. Our awareness of this enables us to determine our political stand from a general view to a more comprehensive one. As revolutionaries, we cannot separate 'a part from the whole' or 'the specific from the general'. A comprehensive view of developments enables us to formulate the correct steps for the present and future stages. With this view and through the struggle process, revolutionary resoluteness and high morale, we are able to handle the difficulties imposed by our position.

It is necessary to understand that it is our revolutionary and legitimate right, through the struggle process, to judge which compromises are acceptable and which should be rejected at any specific time. Determining the positions of the revolution is not based on the leaders' personal whims, nor on motives of revenge resulting from a past experience. Rather it is based on evaluation of the basic conditions which play a role in the results.

*First: The specific balance of forces*

From what position do we compromise? Who are the forces leading the compromise? What is their ideological, political and practical nature?

*Second: accurately determining the appropriate political moment (situation) and assessing the internal and external factors*

In light of the final results, linked with the reality of the party that the compromise is taking place with, the correct stand is formulated.

Let us put aside the details concerning the history of the Jordanian regime since its inception... its role in oppressing and conspiring against our patriotic masses, and its deep involvement in the imperialist schemes. Let us put aside as well the bloody history of intense struggle against the regime ('70-71). If we are precise concerning the

present situation, what do we find?

Concerning the first condition, we note that the regime is reliant upon the umbrella of official Arab solidarity in order to cover its political and economic crisis. The Jordanian regime imposes its conditions on the platform of what is called the framework of joint action. This situation will not affect the essence of its policy, which is to deal blows to our side. On the contrary, Hussein is eager to participate as he is able to control this game and destroy it at the right moment.

We have not yet attained the level, politically or militarily, which would enable us to direct this trend in our favour or to set the conditions for compromising. Rather the rope has remained in the hands of the regime, to loosen or tighten according to the contents of its policies for opposing the patriotic stand, the Palestinian cause and suppressing the masses.

Concerning the second condition, what was the political moment of the compromise? Was it a moment of joint confrontation against the enemy in order to defend joint interests? Or was it a moment of tactical retreat on the part of the other party? A step shifting its position towards the patriotic camp, even if only a partial one?

We affirm the importance of the political moment because it reflects the other side of the scale, which is important in balancing the compromise. Let us take an example: In World War II, Stalin compromised with imperialism, the primary enemy of socialism, in order to form a temporary alliance to confront the Nazi attack. The answer is clear: in light of the joint factors, it was to the interest of both parties to destroy Nazism. However, we do not see the Jordanian regime preparing for a joint confrontation against the Zionist enemy, in spite of the fact that the Zionist enemy is a continual threat. On the contrary, this regime continues to aid the enemy by closing its borders to the resistance movement. This is a historical characteristic of the regime since the 1920's. If we examine the common factors between the Zionist enemy and the Jordanian regime – killing, torture and expulsion against those patriots who oppose them – we can see that the common denominator upon which they agree is opposing the Revolution and the patriotic masses.

Is there a possibility for the regime to retreat from its present policy? We do not view the policies of the regime as being different from its past policies in relation to patriotic issues of the region in general or to the Palestinian national cause in specific. In reference to the appropriate political moment for the compromise, I don't believe

FREEDOM FOR OUR FELLOW-  
PRISONERS OF THE NATIONAL  
MOVEMENT HELD IN THE  
JORDANIAN PRISON.

SIXTH GENERAL CONGRESS OF G.U.J.S.

that there is a single idiot in the Arab nation, who can convince himself or the masses that the regime can shift to a patriotic position. Thus we can see that neither of the conditions — balance of forces or choice of the appropriate political moment — favor this compromise. Is there any foundation upon which the PLO leadership can rely? The only thing that the PLO could possibly rely on is the regime's vocal rejection of Camp David. In fact, the regime's practices are more dangerous than Camp David, because imperialism's plans for the future are masked by the Palestinian trump card, under the umbrella of official Arab solidarity.

Full consciousness of the fundamental tasks of the Revolution at this point must be based on a farsighted understanding of the objective and subjective conditions. In view of the regime's growing crisis and the masses' rising consciousness, it is our task to encourage our masses to employ all forms of class and national struggle in order to advance. This is the only course for our Revolution to gain a secure base — liberated and progressive — for confronting the enemy and liberating our masses from the oppressive bourgeois regime in Jordan.

Day by day the danger of the relation between the PLO and the Jordanian regime is becoming clearer. In the interests of continuing the march of the revolution, it is our duty to alert the PLO leadership of this danger and the increasing role of the regime in preparation for the coming stage of the capitulationist path. This entails weakening the Palestinian national role, by placing it under the regime's hegemony and by striking it in cooperation with the other enemy forces.

Our position is not due to a desire to single ourselves out, nor to a narrow sectarian view. Rather our consciousness in carrying out our national tasks alerts us to the danger of this relation. Based on this, we took a position of rejecting this dialogue and relation with the Jordanian regime. Future events will prove the correctness of our stand.

**Now, after nearly one year of the relations between the Jordanian regime and the PLO, which were recently renewed, what is your evaluation of the results?**

Let us start by comparing the joint working paper between the PLO and the Jordanian regime with the political program adopted in the 14th P.N.C.

Section 8 of the working paper states as a general principle: to take the necessary measures to prevent any action which would give the Zionist enemy an excuse for carrying out its plots against Jordan. Can anyone interpret this section as other than agreement on no fighting from across the Jordanian border against the Zionist enemy? After 32 years of occupation, this is the essence of the regime's answer to the national question — to prevent any action. Is there a common denominator with this regime for struggling against imperialist-Zionist plots? When this regime prevents two million Palestinians-Jordanians from participating in the struggle?

What does it mean "to take the necessary measures"? Does it mean cooperation in prohibiting actions and deterring activities against the enemy? Does it mean that we become accomplices to the regime's policies, suppressing the patriotic desires of our masses to participate in the struggle?

Now let us examine the political and media levels. Section D refers to "neutralizing the friends of Israel". Who are the friends of 'Israel' except world imperialism headed by the U.S.? Do we become King Hussein's partners in flirting with U.S.? Or does imperialism remain the primary enemy of our people, and cause, and the enemy of peace and humanity? Isn't this drawing us into a stand which we reject? Is this what is demanded after years of suffering, destruction and

slaughter by U.S. weapons? After all of this, we seek cooperation with this regime on such a basis instead of imposing our conditions on it? The criteria for the revolution's cooperation with any party must be its anti-imperialist position, but the written agreement shows that it was the regime and not the PLO that enforced the conditions.

Let us move to the sections of the political program of the last P.N.C. concerning the relation with Jordan. It is the basis for evaluating the results of this relation. The 5th section states the PLO's commitment to the decisions of the Rabat and Baghdad summits, which reaffirmed that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and reaffirmed our people's right to establish an independent national state. This section stipulates that the relation with the Jordanian regime should be based on these decisions and on the regime's rejection of the Camp David agreements and its consequences; and its practice of this rejection by allowing the PLO to carry out the struggle against the Zionist enemy.

How do we reconcile between "allowing the PLO to practice the struggle against the Zionist enemy" and the clause in section 8 of the Jordanian-PLO working paper? What does this mean for the struggle against the enemy with its two aspects — military and mass mobilization. Every day news comes out of mass arrests of Palestinian militants in Jordan. The most recent campaign was the detention of 13 militants, charged with attempting to cross the border to 'Israel'. What about opposing Camp David, while suppressing student demonstrations at Amman and Yarmouk universities, condemning the March '79 agreement? Or the expulsion of students and unjust trials and imprisonment of others for as much as ten years for demonstrating against the Camp David agreements? The danger culminates when these policies are allowed to continue unchallenged, out of consideration for preserving the relation between the PLO and this regime.

In addition, the negative points outweigh the positive in the work of the joint committees, established at the Baghdad Summit to support the steadfastness of our masses in the occupied territories. Our political losses are greater than the gains achieved through distributing the funds. This exemplifies the danger of the Jordanian regime becoming a partner in the Palestinian destiny. This is not limited to the direct oppression of patriots in Jordan, but also concerns our masses in the occupied territories, where the Jordanian regime is intervening in various municipalities and institutions. Its effect on these decisions is becoming more offensive, as is its support to reactionary figures and institutions which have historic links to the regime based on mutual economic interests.

In this context, we should recall the political conflict which occurred in the 12th P.N.C. held in Cairo in 1974. At that time, the PLO leadership was relying on the ideas of a Palestinian state through Geneva and eliminating the slogan of 'No to negotiations'. This was with the pretext of closing the door for the Jordanian regime to participate in the self-determination of our people.

Where are we now in relation to the practice of the decision taken in '74 concerning Jordan? Isn't the Jordanian regime now a partner in the Palestinian political decision? Don't the joint committees give this regime a legitimate facade? Doesn't silence about the regime's political preparations for the coming stage mean the nullification of the slogan 'No to occupation, No to the return of the Jordanian regime to meddle in our internal affairs'? Doesn't this open relation negate the efforts of our masses in Jordan to take their national and class role against the regime?

We reject the basis of this relation and not only its conditions, as we believe the regime is gaining the most. This in itself is harmful to us.



You mentioned that the Jordanian regime is in a state of waiting for a settlement. What political situation will enable it to enter the settlement?

Yes, the Jordanian regime is still knocking on the door of capitulation, while following the developments on various fronts.

Most important, it is waiting for the destruction or weakening of the Palestinian Resistance in Lebanon. It is waiting for this opportunity in cooperation with U.S. imperialism, Zionism and the Lebanese fascist front. Such a defeat would enable King Hussein to promote the plans he has been keeping under his hat – Jordanian-Israeli solutions for absorbing the Palestinian national identity. It is precisely the task of absorbing the Palestinians, which the tripartite alliance has been unable to achieve due to the steadfastness of our masses in and outside of Palestine.

Second, the regime is waiting for Syria to weaken its position against Camp David. There is much documentation of the Jordanian regime's long arm inciting rightist religious forces in Syria. The aim of these actions, specifically now, is not only against the Syrian regime and its relation to the masses and their demands for democratic rights. It also aims to create maximal sectarian discord and chaos in order to disrupt Syria's measures in opposing Camp David; to corner Syria with difficult alternatives, one of which is accepting the American-Zionist conditions. To us, Syria represents a material and geographical position, which is an influential factor in the reality of the movement and its political future.

Third, King Hussein is waiting for the new steps of U.S. imperialism, based on the results of the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations. The regime is aware that the U.S. administration is not willing to limit itself to the Israeli-Egyptian alliance, which is only one step on the road.

U.S. policy is based on dividing the links (parties involved in the conflict) and reassembling them on one chain in the hands of imperialism. The timing of this is to a large degree dependent on the U.S. elections this year, and Israeli elections next year.

Carter is hoping to win the elections and that the Israeli Labour Party will defeat the Likud, because the Israeli Labour Party has demonstrated an understanding of the settlement closer to Carter's than has the Likud. Allon, one of Labour's central members, has proposed a solution which coincides with King Hussein's 1972 proposal for the "United Jordanian Kingdom". A Labour victory could reactivate the Allon-Hussein plans. Even so, it will not be easy for them to overcome the present obstacles, the most important being the Palestinian one; nor is it easy for the PLO leadership to hand over all its cards to the Jordanian regime.

In a press conference in December '79, King Hussein outlined a project, which is in reality a renewal of the "United Kingdom Plan". He said, "We have an alternative to the closed door of Camp David. The territories should be returned to us under the auspices of the U.N. for a period of five years, since we are the party concerned in U.N. Resolution 242; afterwards an international committee should supervise the elections for the right of Palestinian self-determination.

Politically, this has double implications: First, that the Jordanian regime is the party concerned vis-a-vis Palestinian territory (a return to the policy of enveloping the Palestinian national identity).

Second is the negation of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This not only contradicts, but also nullifies the resolutions adopted at the Algeria, Rabat and Baghdad summits, and the verbal commitments to these resolutions.

Is there a role for the Jordanian regime in the present settlement-Camp David?

At the present time, we do not believe so. This regime is not against Camp David, but it has not yet conceived its role. The regime also realizes that the factors that would enable it to violate the official Arab stand are not yet present. Hussein is still waiting, keeping his doors open to imperialism and even to the Israeli leadership. Secret meetings are being held with Rabin and Peres. Hussein is seriously searching through private means, which does not contradict with his waiting for achievements by imperialism on the other fronts. In this situation, the Saudi regime constitutes a political and economic support to keep Hussein running in the race to serve imperialism.



*Hussein cultivating his 'private' contacts with Linowitz, special US envoy in the 'autonomy' talks.*

What are the implications of the latest change in the Jordanian cabinet?

It is natural for any regime to have its policies and tactics representing interests of the ruling class. Each class has its means of protecting its authority.

The latest cabinet change which brought Abdel Hamid Sharif as Prime Minister hasn't changed the laws of the ruling class. Sharif is a legitimate son of the regime and continues to protect its heritage with new deceptive means.

Prior to being appointed to head the cabinet, he presented many of his political opinions in lectures at the Jordanian University Graduates Club in August '78. He presented the liberal opinions which he learned from the European-American school. He discussed Arab unity, Palestine and three aims (1) development projects (2) political democracy (3) government institutions—all on the basis of the interests of the bourgeoisie. Whether Sharif likes it or not, this bourgeoisie remains as a dependent and non-productive one, its interests intertwined with the feudalists and tribalists. The conditions of the socio-economic formation do not enable it to play the same role as the European bourgeoisie did. Through the Parliament, the European bourgeoisie legislated working hours, unions, women's rights and education in the service of its own interests. Today under the impact of the crisis we can see that the European bourgeoisie has become increasingly reactionary since instituting these changes.

Sharif puts forth three essential questions:

1. Why have positive efforts to change and advance the establishment of political institutions in the Arab nation been disrupted?
2. Why was true economic development and development towards a democracy and modern responsible state disrupted?
3. Why have these goals remained desires, instead of becoming achievements?

Sharif returns to his class position in his conclusion: "political progress and development will only be achieved through interaction, training and practice, by drawing up a new spiritual charter for the nation which will vitalize each patriot with the principles of awaking and superiority". Here we notice the deception of the bourgeois theoreticians speaking from their position within the state bureaucracy, for Sharif represents the material form of the disease. He proposes spiritual treatment — an all-out lie. The doctor realizes his interest, but he doesn't realize the interest of the patient. This is like treating heart disease with witchcraft.

During the feudalist era in Europe the feudalist possessed, in addition to the land and peasants, two weapons — the henchman and the priest. The henchman was for the disobedient and the priest was to give the hope of salvation in order to make the people obedient.

In order to understand the new Prime Minister, it is beneficial to follow his train of thought and its direction in reality. He spoke much about democracy and the role of the human being. Sharif now presides over the government in Jordan, where there are hundreds of political prisoners, military trials and expulsions of patriots whose only crime is believing in their cause.

The changes in the Jordanian cabinet were based on two considerations:

1. Sharif represents a more dynamic spirit for drawing up the Jordanian policy, especially on the Arab and international levels. His appointment at this particular time coincides with the regime's plans for strengthening its political mobility for 1980-81, in order to stabilize its position in the settlement schemes. Sharif has been designated as the one skilled in handling contacts with Arab reaction, the U.S. and Western Europe.

Sharif gives the impression of being more understanding towards the Palestinian cause and he is skillful in explaining the thinking of the regime. This was exemplified in his last lecture at the Royal Institute of Foreign Relations in London. Let us look at two of the phrases he used. He spoke of Israeli "insistence on rejecting the Palestinian people's right to self-rule and national existence". Notice how he slipped in self-rule in the context of safeguarding the rights of the Palestinian people and national existence, while the regime verbally joins the PLO in rejecting the self-rule plan. He also said, "In our search for peace, we must take in account the common interests and legitimate aspirations, so that the solution will be enacted on the basis of the material and moral balance of the forces of the area."

Doesn't this phrase fall into the stew of Sadat, to be served on the same platter, namely, the normalization of political, economic and cultural relations with the Zionist enemy.

2. The new cabinet was installed as a sponge to absorb the effects of the regime's growing crisis.

In addition to American aid, Arab support has poured into Jordan to bolster the regime and give Hussein a patriotic image. Yet the greedy compradors, commissioners and contractors have ravaged the country, converting the lives of the people into an economic, political and social hell.

Naturally the ruling class, headed by the regime, is suffering from the disease of the overall crisis of capitalism, due to its dependency

and market relations with this system. However, this fact does not decrease the immensity of the sums being poured into Jordan. As an example, the regime originally requested \$800 million at the Baghdad Summit, but was rewarded with \$450 million extra.

Our aim here is not to present a comprehensive economic study, but to point out that there is an increase in the crisis, in class oppression and exploitation, as well as in political repression. In October, this situation led the people of South Jordan in desperation to march towards Amman with their demands — expulsion of the corrupt government and a stop to the rising prices, aid for the families of the South in light of the fact that their life subsistence is based on agriculture and livestock. The fact that most of their demands were economic in no way detracts from their basic awareness that the roots of their problems are to be found in the ruling authority.

There were also secondary issues involved, such as the sex scandal which touched figures of the regime, but basically the new cabinet was appointed as a sponge to absorb the masses' deep-rooted hatred of the regime. The idea was to initiate moral discussions about the social crisis, while stabilizing the monopolies, contractors and commissioners; to renew the discussion of democracy, while increasing political prisoners, unjust trials and surveillance of patriots. The Palestinian cause is to be discussed, while the regime escalates its crack-down on militants, its protection of enemy security and broadens its avenues towards the settlement.

These bourgeois deceptions must not pass unexposed; the slogans of solidarity may sound good, but in reality they are devoid of content. The responsibility for exposing the regime's deception, and for mobilizing the masses vis-a-vis daily and political issues to pave the way for a national democratic authority, lies with the patriotic democratic forces.

**What distinguishes Jordan from the other countries which border Palestine?**

Jordan's common border with Palestine is longer than that of any other state. However, this fact alone does not account for why we consider it as a fundamental arena for our struggle, a base which must be gained by the patriotic democratic forces. Due to the particular historical development, this arena contains several factors, which we consider fundamental in the continuation of our long-term war against the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary enemy.

These factors are:

1. The composition of the population of Jordan makes it the position of the largest concentration of the Palestinian masses outside of Palestine. Statistics indicate that 60% of the population is Palestinian.

2. The second factor, which is linked with the first, is the political, economic and social integration between our two peoples — Palestinian and Jordanian — in Jordan. This has reflected itself through the history of struggle, in the form of parties and other organizations, and in the common realities imposed on all our masses in this part of the Arab World.

3. The Jordanian arena presents a unique opportunity for preparing our revolution to enter the correct channel of enriching and protecting itself with the progressive Arab scope. This has strategic, geographical and mass implications. Bordering more than one Arab country, Jordan presents a framework for the development of our popular revolution on the patriotic, national and social levels.

Our program must correspond to the facts of these three positive factors. The fundamental subjective conditions, the unified program, the unified instrument, must be created corresponding to the particular conditions of the struggle against the national enemy —



Zionism – and against the class enemy. The class and national aspects of the struggle will reinforce each other in advancing towards the establishment of a patriotic democratic regime, which would open new horizons for the masses and the revolution.

This explains, to a great degree, the regime's policy of striking any revolutionary development, including struggle against the Zionist enemy. The regime is not blind to the fact that the results of the struggle will lead to the growth of consciousness and common struggle on all fronts.

**Can you describe the political, social and economic problems encountered by the masses in Jordan, which have led to the increase in popular protest?**

It is fundamental that we recognize the elements of the crisis, no matter what form they assume. All its various forms have one common root, namely, the nature of the bourgeoisie, its alliance with feudalism and the increased proportion of bureaucrats in the last decade. The bourgeoisie's fangs were extended to suck up everything; this bourgeoisie established construction companies; it absorbed Arab capital and expanded its institutions and production, which in the past was non-productive, infantile and dependent. The new input was oil revenues channeled as aid, the capital of immigrants and companies of various origins. In this the bourgeoisie relied on its ownership of real estate and agricultural lands, its stocks in companies and banks and its managers in the factories.

According to the last official statistics, the population of Jordan is 2,150,000, of which the dominating sector constitutes 5%. The rest of the population lives in poverty and suffers double oppression – class oppression by the reactionary bourgeoisie and national oppression due to their being dispersed and endangered by the Zionist enemy.

35% work in agriculture, as share-croppers, small peasants or agricultural labourers. According to the Central Bank's statistics, their income is equal to 10% of the national income. There are thousands employed within the state administration and institutions, in the army and security. A minority of these employees have high positions, linking their interests to those of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, while the majority are placed in the lower ranks and live on loans. They cannot find housing at a cost which corresponds with their income. Prices are increasing daily. These things have an especially marked effect, as the responsibility of the employee or soldier does not end with his immediate family, but includes parents and younger brothers and sisters. As there is no social security, the extended family depends on the employed son.

At the forefront of the oppressed and exploited are the workers in the factories, service, construction and agriculture. Jordanian workers are being expelled by various means and replaced by South Koreans. (At present, there are 8,000 Korean workers in Jordan). The regime attempts to destroy the growing working class, by appointing its agents to head many of the unions, which organize the majority of workers. There are no laws except those which serve the bourgeoisie, no protection from the police, no social welfare.

The education system reinforces this trend; secondary schools and universities fail the majority of the students, while the children of the well-to-do receive their education at American and European universities, regardless of their merits. Tuition is raised annually; students are prohibited from forming unions to organize their initiatives and defend their rights. Anyone discovered as a member of the General Union of Jordanian Students or the Jordanian National Student Union is subject to expulsion or imprisonment.

Political detainees are tried under military law. Political parties are

forbidden. There is no freedom of the press. Democracy, as defined by the ruling class, is democracy for them alone. As an example, the advisory council was established by royal decree.

Beginning in 1978, we have seen renewed mass manifestations. When the Zionists invaded South Lebanon, there were demonstrations throughout Jordan. Simultaneously, there were spontaneous actions against the oppression and exploitation. Many expressed readiness to join the Resistance in South Lebanon.

These events had many positive results. In the first place, they shattered the wall of fear which has surrounded the masses. The Popular Convention was held with the participation of organizations, parties and unions, where a General Secretariat was elected for this assembly of the popular forces in Jordan.

While appearing to kneel before the explosive situation, the regime was in reality planning a double-cross. The call for volunteers to South Lebanon was permitted with the idea of 'transferring' these volunteers to prison. The General Secretariat was allowed to function until the situation cooled down; then its active members were arrested in order to dissolve it. As usual, the regime was true to the character of Arab reaction, which is that of a lion against the masses, but jumps like a scared rabbit at the sound of the national enemy's footsteps. History proves this. In spite of all the measures for patching the regime's ugly face, including the 1979 attempts to stir up nationalist chauvinism at the Jordan University, the facts cannot be hidden. On the contrary, there is growing awareness among the Jordanian people that the regime and the ruling class are the agents of imperialism, clinging to the coat tails of its market.

The October march to Amman was initiated by tribes from the south. Yet their demands had broad social and political implications, because the majority of the masses suffer from the same oppression. The marchers were shouting: The millionaires are growing and the castles of the royal family are increasing, while our sons are naked and starving. Our livestock is dying of thirst, while the government is drowning in the pools of scandal and turns a deaf ear to the demands of the people.

The really positive note in this is that it reflects the spread of consciousness in the ranks of the masses. The King felt the instability in its structures; his left hand presented the new government, while the right directed a campaign of mass arrests, striking patriots in the towns and the camps. Those who speak about human rights must usher the Red Cross into the Jordanian jails to see those who are detained, some since '75.

The conditions in Jordan demand greater alertness on the part of the patriotic democratic forces in politicizing the struggle of the masses and determining the correct demands and slogans for the march to achieve their goals.

**What is the Jordanian regime's role in exporting counter-revolution?**

From its establishment, the regime in Jordan was a gendarme in the hands of the British, to strike the Palestinian movement and protect the colonial routes and interests, as well as to suppress the masses in Jordan. The regime aided colonialism in executing the Balfour Declaration. One of its first ventures into other countries was sending army units against the revolution of Rasheed Ali Al-Kilani in Iraq in the early forties. After 1948, King Hussein concentrated on strengthening his repressive institutions, in accordance with the new task assigned to the regime, that being to crush the Palestinian national identity. He transformed his military forces to security forces along the border of the Zionist occupation.

The '67 defeat brought disgrace to the regime, as his army fled from the enemy's advance. The shaken condition of the regime

permitted a situation in which the armed Palestinian Resistance grew. But the regime re-organized its repressive forces to strike the Resistance and the masses. Starting with the battles at the end of '68 to take the pulse of the Resistance, and continuing in the fierce battles of 1970-71, the efforts of the regime were tenfold those exerted against the Zionist enemy over thirty years.

At the same time, Hussein sent its engineering corps and artillery units to Oman to bolster Qabus against the PFLO, cooperating in this task with the Shah's Iran and the British. In addition, the regime aided the Lebanese fascists against the Resistance and the Lebanese Patriotic Movement in the civil war. Hussein has exported dozens of his intelligence agents to the countries of the Gulf and to North Yemen, in cooperation with reactionary circles, for surveillance of Arab patriots. Most recently, he sent a special unit to help suppress the events in the Grand Mosque. This was done in the name of defending Islam, as if Mecca is closer for the regime's forces than Jerusalem; but in its essence it was to protect the position of reaction.

In our estimation, the regime will not miss any opportunity to support any reactionary position regardless of its cost in the blood of soldiers, at the expense of the masses. The regime is prepared to support King Hassan II of Morocco. At present, Jordan is harbouring dozens of SAVAK agents who escaped after the Iranian people's victory.

**In light of what you have said, will you assess the balance of power in Jordan, the forces for change and the program required for their struggle against the ruling class?**

In general, the ruling class is still capable of maintaining its deceptive position within the official Arab patriotic framework. This protects the unity of its institutions and leaves the door open for political contacts and economic refueling to alleviate its crisis. King Hussein is benefiting greatly from the vacillation of Arab patriotic policy on the one hand and from Arab reaction guarding his distinctive position on the other. To the factors strengthening the regime, we must add the openness of the PLO. This contributes to prolonging its rule. We don't claim that cutting off the PLO-Jordanian relation would end the regime, but political isolation will hasten the eruption of its crisis. This will accelerate the development of the revolutionary process and give it greater clarity.

The curtain of opposing Camp David and its agreement is temporary. It will sag in the coming period. The regime will re-emerge brandishing its sword, directly confronting the development of the Arab patriotic movement, the Palestinian Resistance, the masses, all the progressive and revolutionary forces.

In our understanding of the present balance of forces, the objective conditions that could aid our revolutionary struggle are not fully ripe. However, this does not delete our responsibility for compensating this deficiency by working to create the subjective conditions, the most important being:

**1. Dropping the line which says 'the objective conditions are not ripe-let's wait and see'**

This line is based on viewing the position of politically and socially backward societies, where feudal elements remain, as similar to that of Europe before the bourgeois revolution. Hence, completion of the capitalist formation is seen as necessary for development of a working class capable of leading the socialist revolution. Those adopting this tendency ignore the extent of qualitative changes involved in the transition of capitalism to its monopolistic stage, imperialism. They ignore the composition of the local bourgeoisie, its dependent link to the capitalist market and its extreme reaction internally.

**2. A fundamental condition for victory will materialize with the formation of the revolutionary party**

Such a party must grow up from the heart of the toiling masses to form the vanguard, leading and developing the struggle. The party for confrontation is the vanguard of the working class which designs its program on a clear strategical view and correct tactical basis, encompassing all the issues — political, economic and social — in the arena of struggle. The party must possess a clear view of primary and secondary contradictions in making its alliances. It must grasp the political moment and determine the role of the party and the masses in each stage, exposing incorrect tendencies — adventurist or reformist.

**3. The united national front**

The lessons of past battles highlight the necessity of avoiding the isolation of the revolutionary forces, as this can seriously endanger the march of the struggle. Therefore, we should realize that the national front, representing an alliance of the oppressed classes is the correct instrument for expanding the circle of confrontation with the national and class enemies. However great the party and its role, however correct its views, it alone cannot solve the problems of the people at the present stage, in order to carry out the tasks of the national democratic revolution. We must work for establishing a national front in Jordan depending on the following elements for its success:

a) the importance of the national front as a weapon in the hands of the revolutionaries

b) comprehending the present and historical developments of the concept and formation of the national front

c) the importance of drawing up the political and organizational program of the national front

d) taking into consideration the particularities of the country at hand, the nature of the stage and of the contending forces

e) creative implementation of the lessons of other experiences

In light of the three conditions in determining our stand and the nature of the stage, the formation of the national front is an immediate requirement in order to designate the tasks for all militants in the arena, patriotic and progressive. This must be done without plunging into overwhelming strategical slogans.

In light of the gap in the balance of power to the regime's favour on the one hand and the immaturity of the struggle on the other, the matter of designating the appropriate slogan assumes utmost importance. We must mobilize and organize all the masses in Jordan around the slogan:

*We will struggle for seizing our freedom to struggle; to organize mass institutions and unions and to build the party and the front.*

In the context of the slogan of political freedoms, confrontation of the national enemy also assumes priority on our agenda. The Zionist occupation not only infringes on the Palestinian national existence, but it endangers the surrounding area in general, and the masses in Jordan in particular. This demands the united struggle of all our masses in this arena.

These two slogans — political freedom and the right of armed mass struggle against the Zionist enemy — cannot be separated, or compromised. In the present situation, we consider these as the minimum slogans which can rally all the classes, afflicted by the oppression of the regime, against the Zionist enemy.

In conclusion, I would like to praise the role of our masses in Jordan and our struggling comrades, those inside and out of jail. It is their consciousness and perseverance which paves the road of our justified optimism in the masses' victory.